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THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ECONOMIC REGULATION: 
A LEGAL VIEW 
By ROGER C. CRAMTON 
University of Michigan 
Some time ago I came across a quotation which ever since has been 
weighing on my mind. It is reported to have been spoken by an aged 
West Coast Indian, sitting on a rock and looking out to sea, under cir- 
cumstances which I do not know. It reads as follows: "Lighthouse, him 
no good for fog. Lighthouse, him whistle, him blow, him ring bell, him 
flash light, him raise hell; but fog come in just the same."' 
At the risk of oversimplification, I plan to weave my remarks around 
three untested assertions, each of which will require some amplification. 
First, many regulatory actions which are of great interest and concern 
to lawyers have little or no economic significance. Second, under our 
system the exercise of regulatory power bearing directly upon private 
individuals will not ordinarily be tolerated unless subjected to pro- 
cedural safeguards. And third, economic regulation, even where public 
policy is fairly clear and the regulatory task is confined, faces enduring 
problems which limit its potential effectiveness. In the transportation 
industries, where clear objectives do not exist, the governing principle 
is one of ambiguous protectionism, a form of economic regulation which 
has demonstrated characteristic infirmities. 
The most basic question one can ask about economic regulation is 
whether it makes a difference in the behavior of the regulated industry. 
The lawyer is tempted to answer this inquiry by condensing the volu- 
minous mass of decisions and regulations into an orderly analysis of 
regulatory policies. But, as George Stigler has pointed out,2 the enu- 
meration of an endless succession of regulatory actions provides proof, 
not of effective regulation, but of the desire to regulate. The net effect 
of the busy humming of the regulatory machinery may be only to 
irritate entrepreneurs and to enrich their lawyers, without effecting a 
fundamental alteration in the state of affairs that would have existed 
in the absence of regulation. 
A moment's thought will indicate why the economic effect of regula- 
tion is essentially independent of the content of formal regulation. 
'The source of the quotation is W. L. Prosser, "Lighthouse No Good," 1 J. of Legal Ed., 
257 (1948). 
2 George J. Stigler and Claire Friedland, "What Can Regulators Regulate?: The Case of 
Electricity" (unpublished paper delivered to the Economics Club of the University of 
Michigan in March, 1963). 
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The regulation may prohibit conduct which no one desires to engage in 
or it may encourage conduct which will take place anyway. Even if the 
regulation deals with conduct that would take a different course in the 
absence of regulation, it is always possible that the objective so de- 
voutly desired by the regulators will not be achieved. The regulatory 
machinery may be too cumbersome or the ingenuity of circumvention 
too great. In order to determine whether the observed economic be- 
havior in a particular industry is due to the existence of regulation, the 
possible effect of regulation must be isolated from other factors influenc- 
ing behavior. 
The significance of individual regulatory actions cannot be judged 
by the number of lawyels or regulators engaged in the fray, the heat of 
the battle, or the length of the struggle. These external indicia have little 
relationship to the economic significance of the proceeding. It is a safe 
generalization that many of the most time-consuming and expensive 
controversies in regulatory annals have had little economic or social sig- 
nificance-other than as tribal rites which lend legitimacy to conduct 
that otherwise might be viewed as antisocial behavior. On the other 
hand, some regulatory actions, which may or may not be accompanied 
by formal proceedings, elaborate trappings, and controversial publicity, 
are of great economic importance. 
Two separate functions of the Federal Communications Commission 
illustrate the differing significance of regulatory actions. The first- 
allocation of the radio spectrum to various uses-is a function of enor- 
mous importance that determines the manner in which this resource is 
used by society. The Commission decides whether or not a frequency 
will be made available to citizens, such as trucking companies or ham 
operators, who desire to utilize the airwaves to connect their far-flung 
activities, to while away their leisure time, or to accomplish a thousand 
other purposes. If a frequency is made available for a particular pur- 
pose, the nature of the frequency and the terms on which it may be 
used determine the cost of the desired service to the user. It is not an 
accident that we have three and only three television networks. The 
Commission, by its actions in allocating frequencies for television use, 
has created a situation in which there are very few metropolitan centers 
possessing more than three competitive television channels.3 Until this 
situation is remedied and a fourth or fifth station added in all or most 
metropolitan centers, the structure of the television industry will remain 
unchanged. 
In sharp contrast to frequency allocation, the numerous comparative 
licensing proceedings in radio and television conducted by the Commis- 
'The relevant materials are collected and discussed in Note, "The Darkened Channels: 
UHF Television and the FCC," 75 Harv. L. Rev. 1578 (1962). 
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sion have little economic significance. Comparative hearings provide a 
bonanza to the successful applicant, dissipate the energies of regulators, 
and attract the attention of scholars and critics. Yet it is doubtful that 
they have any substantial effect on the conduct of broadcasters. 
Why is this so? In part it is because the criteria for choosing the 
"best" applicant are not meaningful.4 A second factor is that the policies 
applied in comparative hearings may be and are undercut by uncon- 
tested initial grants or subsequent station transfers.5 But a more fun- 
damental reason is that the economic conditions which influence the 
actual conduct of broadcasters remain unchanged. 
Broadcasters operate their stations in order to make money. The 
pattern of operation which will maximize the revenues of a particular 
station will not vary, regardless of who is awarded the station. The 
licensee of a television station, for example, will obtain the most favor- 
able network affiliation that is available to him and he will carry a large 
proportion of network programs. Decisions concerning which network 
programs will be carried and what other programs will be offered will 
be made on economic grounds. Experienced broadcasters faced with 
identical conditions will reach roughly similar results. Comparative 
licensing does not affect these underlying conditions; the only practical 
effect is a substantial delay in the initiation of additional service to the 
affected community. 
Of course, where the number of licenses is limited some method of 
distributing them to qualified applicants must be established. Alterna- 
tives that would accomplish this task in a less wasteful and more de- 
sirable mnanner include public bidding, grant to the first applicant in 
point of time, and administrative discretion. Ronald Coase has argued 
persuasively that the market system is best adapted to determine how 
many frequencies should be devoted to broadcasting uses and who 
should be entitled to operate on each frequency.6 The broadcasters 
and the Commission, as well as most commentators, have neither un- 
derstood nor seriously considered this proposal. Their efforts have 
been directed at better definition of the criteria by which the "best" 
broadcaster is chosen. Yet, even if more objective standards can be 
developed, which seems doubtful, the effort expended in comparative 
hearings will be wasted as long as the policies applied in such hearings 
'For useful critical discussions of the substantive and procedural aspects of comparative 
broadcast licensing, see Henry J. Friendly, "The Federal Administrative Agencies: The Need 
for Better Definition of Standards," 75 Harv. L. Rev. 863, 1055-72 (1962); Administrative 
Confereince of the United States, Committee on Licenses and Authorizations, "Licensing of 
Major Broadcast Facilities by the Federal Communications Commission" (rev. draft Sep- 
tember, 1962) (prepared by William K. Jones, Columbia Law School). 
5About 90 percent of all commercial television stations authorized in mid-1961 resulted 
from uncontested initial grants ratlher than comparative proceedings. License transfer occurs 
on a large scale: over 10 percent of outstaniding licenses are sold each year. 
'R. H. Coase, "Federal Communications Commission," 2 J. of Law and Econ. 1 (1959). 
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can be easily circumvented, and, in any event, do not affect the eco- 
nomic conditions faced by the individual broadcaster. Any attempt 
to restrict these flexible avenues for prompt service and new entry is 
likely to be a cure worse than the disease. Individualized licensing 
proceedings are not the appropriate method of dealing with the funda- 
mental conditions which influence the conduct of broadcasters. To the 
extent that there is agreement on policies which broadcasters should 
follow-such as a minimum amount of public affairs programming or 
limits on the degree of commercialization-such policies can be effec- 
tively and directly implemented by general regulations applicable to 
all broadcasters, with license revocation as the ultimate sanction for 
noncompliance. 
A similar analysis may be applied to other areas of regulation. Some 
regulatory actions affect the structure of the industry or the behavior 
of its firms; others affect only the fortunes of the individual partici- 
pants. Decisions involving the extent and nature of competition to be 
permitted in a particular market have considerable economic signifi- 
cance. But if it has already been decided that there will be three and 
only three air carriers (or motor carriers) in a particular market, the 
choice of the particular carrier, standing by itself, is unlikely to make 
much difference. If there are going to be only three airlines operating 
between New York and Atlanta, does it really matter to the public 
whether the third service is rendered by Braniff or Delta? 
II 
As noted above, under our system the exercise of government power 
bearing directly on private individuals will not be tolerated unless sub- 
jected to procedural safeguards.7 Legal tradition tends to be individual- 
istic and negative in its approach to economic regulation. "Lawyers," it 
has been said, "focus on the fact that public officials and tribunals are 
going to be fallible at best and incompetent or abusive at worst."8 Tra- 
ditional legal principles serve to limit discretion by providing the 
official with as little elbow room as possible for error, whimsey, or bias. 
Extended hearings allow interested persons to contribute to the de- 
cider's knowledge; the written decision must elaborate the reasons for 
choice by reference to the legislative standard; and court review is 
available to insure that procedural requirements and statutory limita- 
tions are observed. One cannot speak of law in our society-or "the 
rule of law"-without including procedures which allow citizens to 
I For the argument at this point I am indebted to the excellent piece by Louis L. Jaffe, 
"The Effective Limits of the Administrative Process," 67 Harv. L. Rev. 1105 (1954). 
8 Kingman Brewster, "Enforceable Competition: Unruly Reason or Reasonable Rules," 
A.E.R., May, 1955, pp. 482, 484. 
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participate in a meaningful way in governmental decisions which bear 
directly upon them as individuals. 
It is often contended, especially by nonlawyers, that judicial attitudes 
and processes, with their emphasis on adversary presentation of evi- 
dence, cross-examination, and contentious record-building, are unsuited 
to the implementation of broad public policies by regulatory agencies. 
There is often justification for the charge that judicialized procedures 
are applied thoughtlessly to functions to the solution of which they do 
not contribute. In my judgment, the comparative hearing in broadcast 
licensing is one such instance. 
There is room for legitimate difference of opinion concerning the 
point at which the increased accuracy of formal decisions, when con- 
trasted with summary decisions, is offset by their relative inefficiency. 
Yet there is little room for doubt that the citizen, regardless of relative 
efficiency, finds summary discretion distasteful and unacceptable when 
applied to his own concerns. If he is to be excluded from a particular 
activity or if the retuirn which his property may earn is to be controlled 
on individual grounds, he demands an opportunity to participate in the 
making of the decision. Our legislatures reflect this democratic choice 
when they insist, in statute after statute after statute, that regulatory 
powers be exercised only after full hearings. As long as this preference 
prevails, the procedure which it demands will constitute a limiting con- 
dition on economic regulation. 
III 
There are inherent limitations on the effectiveness of economic regu- 
lation even where public policy is fairly clear and the regulatory task, 
relatively speaking, is confined and manageable. The simpler case of 
economic regulation-the determination of maximum rates of a con- 
ventional public utility-has not been performed with obvious success. 
I do not assert that public utility regulation has been a failure. I do 
maintain, however, that unqualified assertions of its effectiveness would 
be unwarranted. The lesson of a half-century of experience is that the 
environment generates enduring problems which limit the potential 
effectiveness of rate regulation. 
The regulation of interstate telephone rates by the Federal Com- 
munications Commission during the period 1953 through 1962 illus- 
trates the general proposition.9 The objectives are clear and limited; 
9Congressional investigations have resulted in the publication of a great deal of material 
relating to interstate telephone regulation, including internal memoranda prepared by the 
FCC staff for the Commission. See Hearings on the Antitrust Problems of the Satellite 
Communications System Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate 
Committee on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2 (1962); Antitrust Subcommittee of 
the House Judiciary Committee, Report on Consent Decree Program of the Department 
of Justice, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 73-83 (1959); Hearings on the Consent Decree Program of 
the Department of Justice Before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Com- 
mittee, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 3427-570 (1958). 
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and the methods are traditional and well established. Yet a detailed 
look at the methods and mechanics of regulation suggests strong doubts 
concerning its effectiveness: disputed issues have been compromised 
by the Commission after private negotiation with the Bell System; 
standards for determining allowable expense, items includible in in- 
vestment, and cost of capital have never been determined; and a rela- 
tively high rate of return of 7.5 percent over an extended period has 
encouraged investors to treat A. T. & T. stock as a growth rather tlhan 
as an income security. The FCC has never even explained or attempted 
to justify this state of affairs. 
I do not offer this as a demonstration of the ineffectiveness of federal 
telephone regulation. My thesis is that this pattern is typical, that 
doubts of similar dimension could be raised concerning the performance 
of nearly all regulatory schemes. Why is this so? What are the limiting 
conditions on the effectiveness of economic regulation that emerge from 
the task itself or that are imposed by the environment in which it 
operates? 
I have spoken of the relative simplicity of conventional public utility 
regulation in that its purposes are fairly clear and its methods well es- 
tablished. Public utility regulation is made a manageable function by 
the ability to treat each company as a separate unit subject to detailed 
accounting regulations. In addition, most areas of conventional public 
utility regulation are shielded in varying degrees from the disruptive 
effect of outside influences, such as competition from unregulated sub- 
stitutes. Even so, the complexity of the regulatory task is staggering. 
The treatment of joint costs in the telephone industry or the explanation 
of the toll rate disparity between interstate and intrastate rates are 
problems that tax the abilities of able economists.10 It is easy to under- 
estimate the difficulty of the problems if one is not responsible for the 
results nor embarrassed by an overabundance of information. 
Inadequacies of personnel and appropriations constitute a second 
limiting factor that seems to be endemic. A handful of poorly paid 
employees are asked to perform complex tasks of regulation requiring 
zeal and imagination. Before long nearly all of the available manpower 
is tied down in the processing or review of routine matters. Once the 
immediate needs which produced regulation have been assuaged, the 
public loses interest and the agency falls into a routine in which day- 
to-day accommodations are made with those subject to the regulation. 
A third limiting factor, already mentioned, is the inertia resulting 
from the agencies' limited power under typical statutory provisions to 
take decisive action without extensive formal proceedings. Indeed, 
10 See the study by Leland L. Johnson, Communications Satellites and Telephone Rates: 
Problems of Government Regulation (prepared for NASA by the RAND Corp. and re- 
printed in Hearings on the Antitrust Problems of the Satellite Communications System 
Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Committee on the 
Judiciary, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, 603-52, 1962). 
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many agencies are unable to defeat proposals of others without a de- 
cision based on a formal hearing and record. Yet formal proceedings 
have their virtues; and their legislative popularity assures that they 
will be with us for a long time. 
Thus far public utility and broadcast regulation have been used as 
vehicles for stating several rather simple theses. I now move to trans- 
portation regulation, a field where the overlay of legislative objectives 
and administrative authority is hydra headed and more complex. This 
is the arena of "ambiguous protectionism": that unnatural state in 
which the salt of competition is joined in uneasy mixture with the 
pepper of protectionism and the whole porridge seasoned with the 
paprika of subsidy and promotion. Experience with various forms of 
ambiguous protectionism over several decades is now sufficient so that 
some of its characteristic infirmities can be stated: (1) lack of a clear 
legislative mandate tends to stultify administration; (2) the passive 
functions of protectionism tend to be implemented more effectively than 
the affirmative functions of development and coordination; and (3) 
competition from alternative forms of transport that are exempt, un- 
regulated, or promoted by another agency tends to limit even the 
effective performance of protective functions. 
1. The objectives of ICC regulation of domestic surface transporta- 
tion are typical in that they reflect several disparate objectives. The 
earliest objectives-the protection of shippers from unreasonable 
charges and unjust discrimination-have a procompetitive flavor, but 
they have become less important as competition has tended to replace 
monopoly in transportation. More recent regulation is based on the 
premise that unrestrained competition in the transport field will pro- 
duce harmful results; transport companies must be protected from their 
own mistakes and their competitors' greed. The Commission was given 
a vague mandate to displace carrier judgments in order to protect 
carrier revenues, coordinate the transportation system, and preserve 
certain historic policies which favor the broad movement of commodi- 
ties, affect the location of industry, and allow or require the continuance 
of unremunerative services. 
After the first years of regulation, when the initial enthusiasm has 
been replaced by a convenient reliance on routine solutions, the vague 
mandate-expressed in terms of some undefined "public interest"-is 
likely to produce a timid and unimaginative approach. Agency mem- 
bers, who are readily identifiable and exposed to attack, are reluctant 
to assume tasks of national planning which they or others may feel 
are beyond their competence or commission. Lack of a clear legislative 
mandate stultifies administration. 
2. The so-called "independence" of the regulatory agency is a source 
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of weakness when the agency is not implementing policies that find 
strong support in a democratic consensus. Isolated from the sources of 
political power, forced to evolve working arrangements with those it 
regulates, dependent on Congress for funds and on the President for 
reappointment, and harassed by an unending succession of congres- 
sional investigations and industry pressures, the agency withdraws 
from committing itself on decisive issues of policy. It drifts along, re- 
sponding to the most urgent pressures as they arise and perpetuating, 
for the most part, regulatory patterns which were created in the past to 
meet different problems. In short, the agency becomes passive, back- 
ward-looking, and resistant to change. 
An important implication of these general tendencies is that the more 
passive functions of protectionism are more effectively implemented 
than the affirmative functions of planning, development, and coordina- 
tion. The ICC, for example, has been notably ineffective in achieving 
affirmative goals of coordination and efficiency. Its powers and pro- 
cedures and the practicalities of their use limit it to a negative and 
restraining role. If it desires to restructure the transportation system 
to ameliorate the problems of the New Haven, it is cast in the role of 
passing on a merger of the New York Central and the Pennsy-not 
exactly the proposal that it was likely to have had in mind. The ICC, 
by expending most of its resources in formal hearings devoted to such 
matters, can negative carrier proposals which threaten the status quo; 
but, like other transportation agencies, it lacks the powers, resources, 
or inclination to formulate and implement affirmative programs. The 
Commission, understandably, concentrates its energies on the most 
manageable and specific of the tasks assigned to it by the legislature: 
protecting interests created in the past and moderating the effects of 
undesirable change. The Commission's attempts to prevent or amelio- 
rate departures from the existing rate structure and traffic pattern-a 
kind of soft-hearted and backward-looking cartelism-indicate its true 
purpose and function as a conservative body fighting a rearguard ac- 
tion against the inevitable forces of change. 
3. It is ironic that even the regulatory function that is performed 
most effectively in the transportation field-that of protecting estab- 
lished carriers from new competition-is hedged about with statutory 
provisions and jurisdictional limitations which impair its effectiveness. 
The provision for "grandfather rights" to carriers in business when the 
Motor Carrier Act was passed meant that the existing structure of the 
industry, which allegedly was characterized by instability and over- 
supply, would be perpetuated.'1 Moreover, each carrier possesses an 
" See Note, "Federal Regulation of Trucking: The Emerging Critique," 63 Colum. L. 
Rev., 460 (1963). 
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unlimited right to expand by adding new equipment and service along 
its certified routes. With a large number of firms already in existence, 
control of the number of trucks would be necessary in order to remedy 
the purported evil of chronic oversupply. Nor is the Commission 
granted any power to rectify mistakes made in granting operating rights; 
licenses can be revoked only for repeated and willful violations. 
Absence of regulatory controls over local carriers, private carriers, 
and haulers of agricultural commodities-together constituting more 
than half of truck transportation-means that at best ICC policies can 
be only partially effective. Finally, the relatively free transferability of 
operating rights allows new blood to enter the industry and provides 
an opportunity for expansion on the part of aggressive operators. 
These limiting factors suggest an argument that transportation regu- 
lation may be tolerable because of its ineffectiveness. There has always 
been a substantial amount of competition within each transportation 
industry. The division of responsibility among a number of jealous 
agencies, each adopting a paternal attitude toward the carriers under 
its wing, assures strong intermodal rivalry. And in any event, the avail- 
ability of unregulated alternatives-exempt, unregulated, and private 
carriage-limits the market power of the regulated common carriers. 
These circumstances introduce a substantial dose of free market disci- 
pline into transportation markets. The record of performance in the 
transportation industries justifies the assertion that the present half- 
way house, despite its deficiencies, is superior to the more effective pro- 
tectionism that would be the only likely result of centralized control 
and broader authority over the transportation industries, the proposal 
that is concealed under slogans of the need for increased "coordination" 
and "integration" in transportation. 
But surely it is a counsel of despair to argue that this great nation 
has blundered its way into a compromise between competition and regu- 
lation which is tolerable because other alternatives might be worse. The 
existing regulatory schemes undoubtedly have produced a substantial 
misallocation of resources. Public aids have distorted the terms of in- 
termodal competition. Regulatory support of high common carrier rates 
has contributed to the dramatic growth of private and unregulated car- 
riage. Attempts to preserve the existing pattern of traffic allocation 
have prevented the railroads from full utilization of the economies of 
scale of their existing capacity. Trends toward concentration through 
merger and toward semicartelization through the activities of rate 
bureaus have been encouraged. 
Economic regulation, like other tools of governmental control of 
society, has characteristic virtues and vices. When the objectives to be 
achieved are clear and precise, techniques for their realization can 
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usually be designed. The task is not easy and the results are not fore- 
ordained. But the job can be done. When the blunderbuss, however, is 
substituted for the rifle and a potpourri of vague or inconsistent objec- 
tives is thrown into regulatory safe-keeping, the results are likely to 
be limited to the protection of established interests or to be wholly un- 
predictable. Regardless of defects or unintended consequences, a regu- 
latory scheme is likely to generate interests that make deregulation ex- 
tremely difficult. Increased attention to the problem of accomplishing 
discrete regulatory objectives in the most limited fashion, disturbing 
other relations as little as possible and avoiding unintended conse- 
quences, would pay great dividends. The lighthouse can and does per- 
form essential tasks; but it cannot be expected to keep out the fog. 
